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Abstract The development of pet robots, toy robots, and
sex robots suggests a near-future scenario of habitual living
with ‘personal’ robots. How should we evaluate their poten-
tial impact on the quality of our lives and existence?
In this paper, I argue for an approach to ethics of personal
robots that advocates a methodological turn from robots to
humans, from mind to interaction, from intelligent thinking
to social-emotional being, from reality to appearance, from
right to good, from external criteria to good internal to prac-
tice, and from theory to experience and imagination. First I
outline what I take to be a common approach to roboethics,
then I sketch the contours of an alternative methodology:
ethics of personal robots as an ethics of appearance, human
good, experience, and imagination.
The result is a sketch of an empirically informed anthro-
pocentric ethics that aims at understanding and evaluating
what robots do to humans as social and emotional beings in
virtue of their appearance, in particular how they may con-
tribute to human good and human flourishing. Starting from
concrete experience and practice and being sufficiently sen-
sitive to individual and cultural differences, this approach
invites us to be attentive to how human good emerges in
human–robot interaction and to imagine, possibilities of liv-
ing with personal robots that help to constitute good human
lives.
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1 Introduction
There is an international trend in robotics from industrial
applications towards robots that play a role in personal life.
The development of pet robots, toy robots, and sex robots
suggests a near-future scenario in which living with robots
will be as habitual as living with TV, mobile phones, and in-
ternet. Such ‘personal robots’ will ‘share physical and emo-
tional spaces with the user’ [1]. They could play a role in
entertainment, education, household, and health care. Some-
times they are called ‘social robots’, and Turkle has pro-
posed the term ‘relational artefacts’ [2]. Perhaps we will
enter in relationships with robots [3]. In any case, personal
robots are likely to have a significant impact on the quality
of our lives and existence. How can and should we evaluate
living with personal robots?
In this paper, I argue for an approach to ethics of per-
sonal robots that advocates a methodological turn from ro-
bots to humans, from mind to interaction, from intelligent
thinking to social-emotional being, from reality to appear-
ance, from right to good, from external criteria alone to good
internal to practice, and from theory to experience and imag-
ination. First I outline what I take to be a common approach
to roboethics, then I sketch the contours of an alternative
methodology: ethics of personal robots as an ethics of ap-
pearance, of the good life, and of experience and imagina-
tion.
2 A Common Approach to Roboethics
A common approach to roboethics (including ethics of per-
sonal robots) is characterised by the following methodolog-
ical features: it focuses on the mind and reality of the robot
and it understands roboethics as a branch of applied ethics
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and ethics of the right. Let me explain these features and
discuss the difficulties they incur.
2.1 Roboethics with a Focus on the Mind and Reality of
the Robot
Unsurprisingly, many existing work in roboethics focus on
the moral status and actions of the robot. For many moral
philosophers, ethics is about holding someone responsible
and about the rightness of one’s actions, and then questions
regarding moral status and action are central. We usually as-
cribe moral responsibility only to beings that have a suffi-
cient degree of moral agency—whatever that means—and
ask about the rightness of what that agent does, has done,
or could do. Robots, then, present a challenge to our tra-
ditional theories of moral responsibility. Do they pass the
moral agency test? Can they be held responsible [4, 5]?
Should we grant them rights? Can we blame them, or even
punish them? How should we treat them [6]? However, this
focus on the morality of robots means that ethical questions
concerning how humans interact with robots and how hu-
mans experience that interaction remain out of sight.
This neglect is reinforced by another development.
Philosophers of robotics rightly feel that they need to en-
gage with research in the field of artificial intelligence (AI),
but this focus on AI usually implies that they base their eth-
ical analysis on questions and assumptions that focus on the
real and on the ‘mind’ of the robot. This is not so much
the problem of AI; designers of artificially intelligent sys-
tems are often focused on what the system does, on what the
programme needs to achieve. But philosophers of AI dis-
cuss problems of representation [7], rationality [8], or ‘soul
issues’ [9]. Although they show the importance of appear-
ance, the well-known ‘Turing test’ [10] and the ‘Chinese
Room’ thought experiment [11] are meant to test how in-
telligent an artificial system is (not how intelligent it ap-
pears). Many researchers in roboethics, then, start from sim-
ilar questions, since for them the moral status of the entity
is at stake (see above). Is this robot really intelligent? Can
a robot become conscious [12]? Could they count as moral
agents [13]? If we know how the robot’s ‘mind’ works [14],
it seems, we can say more about roboethics. In this way,
the emphasis is again on the robot and what the robot really
is or ‘thinks’, instead on how robots appear to us, humans.
Moreover, whereas there is growing attention for social and
emotional aspects of robots, the social and emotional side of
human beings and its significance for the ethics of human–
robot interaction receives much less attention.
Apart from having less relevance, the usual approach to
roboethics also faces a serious difficulty, since it relies on
empirical proof of internal states. Consider the following
example of the current, dominant approach to roboethics. In
his recent paper, published elsewhere in this issue, David
Levy [15] asks the question how we should treat robots.
First, since he sees consciousness as being at the root of
moral status, a major problem he has to deal with is how
to ‘detect’ consciousness. In his paper he discusses several
tests, ranging from the Turing test to the ‘delay test’ (based
on delay conditioning; see work by Clark and Squire). In
this approach, only when we can establish that robots are,
or could be conscious, we can ask Levy’s other question:
should they have rights?
Note that apart from consciousness and the usual ref-
erence to the history of emancipation (first slaves, then
women, are robots next?), he also provides an argument that
is independent from moral status: if we hit a robot, we give
the message to our children that this is how we should treat
people. Although I think this argument does not only ap-
ply to robots but also to many other artefacts in many situ-
ations, I believe this is an interesting point, and one that is
very much based on how we, as imaginative, sensitive, and
appearance-driven beings, easily cross human/non-human
borders in ethical life.
2.2 Roboethics as Applied Ethics and Ethics of the Right
Ethics is often understood as ‘applied’ ethics. In this view,
if we are to evaluate human–robot interaction (perhaps in-
cluding human–robot relationships), we should apply ethical
criteria—moral principles provided by an ethical theory—to
the problem or case at hand. This allows us to judge whether
or not what goes on is ethically acceptable. In roboethics,
this approach means that criteria external to what goes on
in human–robot interaction are applied to it. For instance, if
one thought that paying for sex is morally wrong, one would
judge by this criterion that sex robots are morally not accept-
able. Work such as the Roboethics Roadmap [16] typically
takes an ‘applied ethics’ approach.
For designers, this ‘external’ approach implies that the
aim is to try to ‘build in’ rules in their robot. Just as ‘ex-
ternalist’1 moralists want humans to internalise the external
moral rules, some moralist designers wish robots to have
those rules ‘in them’. For instance, taking their inspiration
from Asimov’s Three Laws of Robotics, they may want to
build robots that avoid harm to humans, obey the orders
of humans, and do not destroy themselves. However, such
an approach to ethics—whether it is applied to humans or
to robots—does not only run into trouble in concrete con-
texts (as Asimov’s own stories show), but also neglects other
kinds of ethical questions.
1When I use the term ‘externalist’ here, I do not refer to the usual
meaning the term has in philosophical discourse, which is about moti-
vation, reasons, justification, or the relation between mental states and
the world. My usage of the term here is restricted to the relation be-
tween a particular practice or interaction, on the one hand, and moral
norms, on the other hand.
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In addition, ethics is often exclusively understood in
terms of the right. Is this behaviour morally right or wrong?
Thus, in roboethics it is asked if using military robots is
morally right (and if the robot is morally responsible for
what it does—see above), if it is morally right for a robot
to harm a human being, if it is morally right to replace hu-
man sex workers by sex robots, etc. This approach leaves
out broader ethical questions, such as which lives we want
to live (with and without robots). It limits ethics to concerns
about things that might go wrong in interactions with ro-
bots; it leaves out the question: what if all goes right, is it
still good to live with these robots?
What is the alternative? Let me make some suggestions
for one possible alternative approach.
3 An alternative: Appearance, Human Good, and
Imagination
A possible alternative to the methodological orientation de-
scribed above is to turn to an ethics of appearance and to an
ethics of human good understood as emerging in experience
and practice. Let me explain what I mean by these terms and
explore the implications for ethics in general and roboethics
in particular.
3.1 Roboethics as an Ethics of Appearance
Instead of asking how human-like robots can become in or-
der to be able to ascribe agency, autonomy, and responsibil-
ity to them, I suggest that we start from studies of how hu-
mans interact with robots on the basis of apparent rather than
real humanoid features (intelligence, consciousness, emo-
tion, etc.). For example, does the face of a particular robot
appear human, and if so, how do we experience this fea-
ture in interaction with that robot? What robots do to us,
depends on how they appear to us, not on what is ‘really’
in their mind. For instance, existing robots are not sentient
and lack feeling; nevertheless, when humans interact with
some types of robots they may act and talk as if the robot
has sensations and feelings. In a similar way, humans tend to
attribute thoughts and beliefs to robots. These observations
are relevant to the way we humans act and live. Rather than
focusing our ethical worries on robots, let us worry about
humans, about what we think, feel, and dream of. The ap-
proach to roboethics I propose is self-consciously anthro-
pocentric instead of robocentric. Instead of a philosophy of
mind concerning what robots really are or really (can) think,
let us turn to a philosophy of interaction and take seriously
the ethical significance of appearance. It is a turn from the
‘inside’ (what is ‘in the mind’ of robots) to the ‘outside’
(what robots do to us). Let us ask: What is the ethical impli-
cation of living with personal robots, that is, of interacting
with them in a personal, social and emotional context? How
do we perceive them, and what do they do to us as social and
emotional beings?
To answer such questions, ethics of robotics can benefit
from empirical studies of human–robot interaction, philo-
sophical and psychological analysis of human emotional and
social life, phenomenological studies of human–robot rela-
tionships, philosophy of technology, and emerging work in
roboethics that starts paying more attention to appearance.
For instance, we can learn from experiments that explore
the minimal requirements for effective human–robot social
interaction [17, 18], requirements that all depend on the ap-
pearance of the robot (e.g. certain facial features). We can
benefit from discussions about Mori’s ‘Uncanny Valley’ hy-
pothesis [19], which again depend on appearance: the hy-
pothesis is that robots who appear almost human,2 can make
us feel uncanny (Freud’s term is unheimlich). We can also
use research on interaction with humanoid robots and pet
robots, such as work from Breazeal [20] and Turkle [2, 21].
We can learn from studies of perception and media [22] that
even computers or simple objects can make us treat them
human-like, from which we can conclude that human–robot
‘social’ interaction is less hard to achieve than those who fo-
cus on the ‘mind’ of the robot may think. We can also benefit
from phenomenological contributions to ethics of human–
robot interaction [23], a philosophical tradition which is par-
ticularly apt to talk about appearance. Of course, we should
then not discuss the robot’s consciousness, but how robots
appear to our consciousness (or better: my consciousness,
given the stress on the first-person perspective). And finally,
we can benefit from the results of recent European research
projects (e.g. ETHICBOTS) and networks (e.g. EURON),
in so far as they teach us something about how we humans
respond to robots.
Note that this approach is also much more in tune with
what contemporary robot researchers and designers do: they
think about what kind of interactions they want to achieve
with their robot. They care less about consciousness, more
about (inter)action and what this does to us. For example,
someone who designs toy robots for children may reflect on
how children will interact with the robot and what kind of
interactions are appropriate for the child to engage in (e.g.
at a certain age or stage of development).
Note that my approach, although directed towards the
‘outside’, is not at all behaviouristic. Let me explain this.
First, my focus on appearance (Dutch: verschijning; Ger-
man: Erscheinung) is meant to draw attention to the expe-
rience on the part of the human. The emphasis is not on
what the robot does (its behaviour), but on what it does to
us. This is not only a matter of observation, but also and
2Consider for instance Hiroshi Ishiguro’s robots, who appear as
‘copies’ of himself and his daughter.
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perhaps more of understanding, of understanding humans,
without involving assumptions about what ‘really’ is ‘in’
the ‘mind’ of the robot. Second, therefore, my approach is
not anti-behaviourist either. Behaviourism would mean that
I claim that what we call mental states are really just pub-
licly observable patterns of behaviour. I do neither agree nor
disagree with that claim. Instead, I remain agnostic with re-
gard to any theory of robot ‘mind’, since I hold that—at least
when applied to the robot—such theories of mind are not
very relevant to the ethical aspects of human–robot interac-
tion.
3.2 Roboethics as an Ethics of Good and an Ethics of
Experience and Imagination
Instead of limiting ethical evaluation of human–robot in-
teraction to the question concerning the morally right, I
propose that we also and especially consider the potential
contribution personal robots could make to human good.
Can human good appear in human–robot interaction (or re-
lationships), or only in human–human interaction (and re-
lationships)? Can human–robot interaction (relationships)
contribute to human flourishing and happiness? Can such
interactions constitute friendship, love, or relationships at
all? Can they co-shape a flourishing community?
Let me explain this approach. What is ‘human good’ or
‘human flourishing’? My use of these terms is inspired by
neo-Aristotelian approaches to ethics, which focus on the
question how we should live and what kind of moral habits
and moral character we should develop rather than on the
question how we should act (at a particular moment in time,
in a specific situation). Moreover, I assume that some ways
of life are better than others and that some goods are good
for all humans (this is a so-called objectivist approach to
what Aristotle called ‘the good life’). Finally, I avoid the
term ‘the good life’ often used in this tradition since I believe
there are many ways of living that can be called good. Hu-
man good is plural. However, what are these human goods
and what does this approach entail for evaluating personal
robots?
The ethical questions asked above can be answered in at
least two ways. One approach is to start from a certain con-
ception of human good, of human flourishing, of happiness,
of friendship, and of love. For instance, we may want to pro-
pose a list of criteria by which we are to judge the ethical
aspects of personal robots. My own version of such a list
is inspired by Martha Nussbaum’s capability approach, and
includes criteria such as health, imagination, affiliation, and
play [24]. I have argued that these criteria can be used to
evaluate robots and (other) artificially intelligent technolo-
gies such as assistive technologies [25]. This, in itself, is an
innovation in ethics of technology since it provides a more
precise and more ‘workable’ definition of human good than
is usual given in ethical theory.
However, if such conceptions of good and such lists are
taken as a priori criteria, pre-conceptions of good, then this
approach is problematic. Above I rejected an ‘externalist’
approach to morality. Criteria might be so general or so re-
mote from what goes on in human–robot interaction, that
they are not very helpful. Therefore, we must take seriously
the specificity of the new technology and of what it does
to us by connecting the theory with practice in a stronger
way. Rather than starting from the capabilities list as a pri-
ori moral norms, we need to start from concrete experiences
and imagination of human–robot interaction and then dis-
cuss what good understood in terms of capabilities means.
Existing research on human–robot interaction can be very
helpful for this purpose, provided it is shares, or is inter-
preted from, the methodological perspective put forward in
this paper. For instance, some interactions with personal ro-
bots may not only help people to develop their capability
for play but also redefine that capability. Good is not inde-
pendent of what happens in practice; it can only exist and
flourish in practice.
In addition, we need an approach that is sufficiently sen-
sitive to individual and cultural differences in experience
and imagination. For instance, if at some point in the future
young people will have been raised with personal robots (as
they are now raised with personal computers, the internet,
and mobile phones), they will not experience robots in the
same way as elderly people who had and have to get used
to them at a later point in their lives (as many have now
difficulties with adapting to contemporary ICT technology
and indeed life-with-such ICT). Furthermore, different indi-
viduals with different characters and personal histories may
respond differently to the same robot, which as already been
observed in nursing homes. And we observe already now
that for instance Japanese people have a different attitude
towards living with robots than people in Europe or the U.S.
Robots.
Thus, whatever human good may be external to human
experience, we must study, imagine, and shape concrete hu-
man living with robots as the locus where good may appear.
Let us listen to people’s experience and use our moral imag-
ination to find out if there are possibilities of living with ro-
bots that enhance human flourishing and happiness. In this
way, the design, use, and regulation of social robots can bet-
ter contribute to good human lives.
4 Conclusion
From the discussion above I conclude that with regard to
ethics of personal robots, a two-fold methodological shift
is desirable and could usefully complement existing ap-
proaches. First, we should take seriously the ethical signif-
icance of appearance by not focusing exclusively on ques-
tions regarding the agency and ‘mind’ of the robot, but rather
Int J Soc Robot (2009) 1: 217–221 221
on how we perceive robots and what they do to us as social
and emotional beings. Second, instead of indulging in fan-
tasies about moral robots with robot rights, we must be at-
tentive to, and imagine, possibilities of living with personal
robots that contribute to, and indeed co-constitute, good hu-
man lives in practice.
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